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Criminal Law
by Laura D. Hogue*
and Franklin J. Hogue"

I.

INTRODUCTION

The tension between prosecuting those charged with violating the laws
of this state and defending the rights of those accused of having
committed crimes sets the stage for the multitude of opinions from the
Georgia Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court in the field of
criminal law. As always, we strive to present cases that will assist
attorneys in their practice, either by surveying cases that present careful
reiteration of age-old principles or by surveying cases that alter old rules
or establish new ones. We limit our Article to cases that affect the
practice of criminal law but omit criminal law cases that deal with
general evidentiary issues and death penalty issues because those
specific issues are addressed in other survey articles in this book.
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PRETRIAL ISSUES

Competency

The predicate to any criminal prosecution is a determination that the
defendant is competent to stand trial. This reporting period, the Georgia
Supreme Court reviewed two cases and made important changes to the
review procedures in a competency determination.
First, in Sims v. State,1 the Georgia Supreme Court abolished the
"any evidence" standard of review for competency determinations and
held instead that the correct standard of review for such verdicts was
the preponderance of the evidence standard.2 In Sims the defendant
asserted that he was mentally retarded and, pursuant to Official Code
of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 17-7-130, 8 filed a plea of
mental incompetency to stand trial for the offense of aggravated
sodomy.4 After a special jury found him to be competent, Sims, along
with his codefendant, was tried for the indicted offense. Sims was found
guilty but mentally retarded.' He appealed and the court of appeals
upheld the verdict, holding that there was "some evidence" to support
the special jury's verdict that Sims was competent.6
On review, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that a competency
hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding.7 As a result, the defendant bears the burden of persuading the jury by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is not competent to stand trial, and like any civil trial,8
the verdict must be affirmed if there was "'any evidence'" to support it.
The defendant's attorneys acknowledged the existing standard of review
but sought to replace it with a less deferential standard of review,
arguing that the "significantly deferential civil standard of review is
inadequate to protect the constitutional standard implicated in a
competency trial because it creates an insurmountable obstacle to
meaningful appellate review of competency determinations."9

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

279 Ga. 389, 614 S.E.2d 73 (2005).
Id. at 391, 614 S.E.2d at 76.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-130 (2004).
Sims, 279 Ga. at 389, 614 S.E.2d at 75.
Id.
Id. at 390, 614 S.E.2d at 75.
Id.
Id. at 390-91, 614 S.E.2d at 75.
Id. at 391, 614 S.E.2d at 76.
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The supreme court agreed."0 The supreme court noted that because
there is a statutory presumption in Georgia that the defendant is
competent, there would always be "some" evidence of the defendant's
competency, which would render the current civil standard of review
meaningless when applied to a competency proceeding.11 Instead, the
supreme court held that as a "quasi-criminal" proceeding, the appropriate standard of review should now be "whether after reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial." 2 Reversing
long-standing precedent," the supreme court then applied the new
standard to Sims and reversed the verdict and the court of appeals
opinion because the 14evidence presented had sufficiently shown that Sims
was not competent.
The issue of competency arose again in Traylor v. State." Traylor
was convicted of felony murder and argued at his motion for new trial
that he had not been competent to stand trial. 6 The issue was
originally presented in the context of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, but Traylor later dropped the ineffectiveness claim and asserted
substantive and procedural denials of due process. 7
Traylor argued that although he did not raise the issue of his
competency either prior to or during the trial, the trial court, nonetheless, had information that should reasonably have raised a doubt about
Traylor's competence, and thus the trial court should have conducted a
hearing to determine his competence." The information that Traylor
referred to was a colloquy between the trial court and Traylor when he
was questioned, outside the presence of the jury, about his decision not
to testify.'9
Traylor gave "somewhat inconsistent" responses to
questions from the court about whether he agreed with his own decision
not to testify."
Following this exchange, Traylor's attorney told the
court that Traylor sometimes had difficulty understanding and

10. Id. at 393, 614 S.E.2d at 77.
11. Id. at 391, 614 S.E.2d at 76.
12. Id.
13. See Stowe v. State, 272 Ga. 866, 536 S.E.2d 506 (2000); Pope v. State, 184 Ga. App.
547, 362 S.E.2d 123 (1987).
14. Sims, 279 Ga. at 393, 614 S.E.2d at 77.
15. 280 Ga. 400, 627 S.E.2d 594 (2006).
16. Id. at 400, 627 S.E.2d at 596.
17. Id. at 403, 627 S.E.2d at 598.
18. Id. at 404, 627 S.E.2d at 598.
19. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 598-99.
20. Id. at 405, 627 S.E.2d at 599.
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enunciating, that he "'has certain disabilities,'" and that he took special
education2 classes, but he was not retarded or "'psychiatrically challenged.' l
The trial court asked for any documentation the attorney had
concerning these issues. Traylor's trial attorney told the court that he
had educational records containing psychological testing but that
counsel's review of the records, as well as his meetings with Traylor,
satisfied the attorney that his client was not incompetent. The trial
court also reviewed the records and found no reason to dispute counsel's
assessment of his client's competence.22 The Georgia Supreme Court
agreed that based upon the colloquy with the court, the records, and
Traylor's pretrial and trial behavior, the trial court did not violate
Traylor's procedural due process rights in failing to conduct a competency hearing.23
But Traylor also raised a substantive due process claim, arguing that
his constitutional rights were violated because he was tried when he
was, in fact, incompetent to stand trial. In support of this claim, Traylor
called a clinical psychologist and clinical neuropsychiatrist, both of whom
testified that Traylor was not competent at the time of trial.24 The trial
attorney testified for the State that his observations of Traylor led him
to believe that Traylor was competent. 25 The trial court denied the
motion, finding that Traylor failed to present "'clear and convincing
evidence to warrant an evidentiary hearing' on his substantive claim of
incompetency."26 The Georgia Supreme Court held that applying this
standard of proof was reversible error.27 Traylor had the burden of
proving his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.28
Because the trial court failed to apply the proper standard of proof, the
by the trial court consistent with
case was remanded for a determination
29
the appropriate burden of proof.
B.

Interpreters

In Ramos v. Terry,"' Ramos, who was of Mexican descent and did not
speak or understand English very well, filed a motion seeking the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 405-06, 627 S.E.2d at 599.
Id. at 406, 627 S.E.2d at 600.
Id. at 408, 627 S.E.2d at 601.
Id.
Id.
Id.
279 Ga. 889, 622 S.E.2d 339 (2005).
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services of an interpreter for his habeas hearing. No interpreter was
appointed by the time the hearing commenced four months later. An
unsuccessful scramble to locate the regular interpreter was followed by
the discovery of a prison employee who spoke Spanish. The court
administered the oath to the prison employee who swore to translate
into Spanish everything that was said in English.31
In his certificate of probable cause to appeal, Ramos argued that he
was denied his right to meaningful access to the court when the court
appointed an interpreter with whom he was not able to communicate.
The interpreter, he argued, was not of Mexican descent and spoke a
different dialect of Spanish than Ramos, which significantly affected
their communications.32 The Georgia Supreme Court certified the
question and considered whether Ramos had been denied his constitutional rights in the habeas proceeding.33
The Georgia Supreme Court noted the rules they had adopted
establishing a state-wide plan for the use of interpreters in cases
involving non-English speaking witnesses and parties.34 The court
observed that the rules contemplate the situation that presented itself
at Ramos's habeas hearing where a certified or registered interpreter
was unavailable. 5
When a certified or registered interpreter is
unavailable, the court stated that the rules require the court to "'weigh
the need for immediacy in conducting a hearing against the potential
compromise of due process, or the potential of substantive justice, if
interpreting is inadequate."'36 The supreme court also observed that
when the habeas court in Ramos's case proceeded without a certified or
registered interpreter, it did not conduct a meaningful inquiry into the
interpreter's background in language skills.37 For example, the court
did not obtain information about:
whether [the interpreter] was a native of a country where Spanish is
spoken, whether she was fluent in English, whether she previously had
translated in a court proceeding, whether she had taken and passed
the interpreter exams administered by Georgia or another state,
whether the Spanish she spoke was compatible with the Spanish

31.

Id. at 889-90, 622 S.E.2d at 341.

32. Id. at 890, 622 S.E.2d at 341.
33. Id. at 889, 622 S.E.2d at 340.
34. Id. at 891, 622 S.E.2d at 341-42 (citing Use of Interpreters for Non-English
Speaking Persons, App. A, Uniform Rule for Interpreter Programs, § I(A), (D)).
35. Id., 622 S.E.2d at 342.
36. Id. (citing Commentary to Rule I, Use of Interpreters for Non-English Speaking
Persons).
37. Id. at 892, 622 S.E.2d at 342.

88
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spoken by Ramos,
and her professional standing in the interpreter
38
community.
The court stated that the interpreter's only qualifications were "her
ability to speak Spanish and her presence."3 9 Accordingly, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that:
[Ilt is an abuse of discretion to appoint someone to serve as interpreter
who is neither certified nor registered as an interpreter without
ensuring that the person appointed is qualified to serve as an
interpreter, without apprising the appointee of the role s/he is to play,
without verifying the appointee's understanding of the role, and
without having the appointee agree in writing to comply with the
interpreters' code of professional responsibility.40
Unfortunately for Mr. Ramos, he failed to preserve this issue, and for
him, these rights were waived. 4 But for future non-English speaking
defendants, the Georgia Supreme Court has made clear through this
opinion that courts must strictly comply with the rules it promulgated
concerning the use of interpreters.
C. Demurrers:Sufficiency and Constitutionalityof the Charging
Documents
The constitutionality of O.C.G.A. section 16-11-34(a),42 the law that
criminalizes any reckless or knowing disruption of a lawful meeting or
gathering, was successfully challenged in State v. Fielden.4' Mr.
Fielden and Mr. Touchton were arrested for violating this statute after
they attended a Valdosta City Council meeting and "stood silently as a
show of support for another citizen who, after speaking during the
'Citizens to be Heard' portion of the meeting, had then refused the
mayor's request to step down from the podium."44 The defendants
challenged the statute as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The
trial court agreed, finding that the statute contained terms that were not
defined in the O.C.G.A. and that the language was not sufficiently
clear.45

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 893, 622 S.E.2d at 343.
Id.

42.

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-34(a) (2003).

43. 280 Ga. 444, 629 S.E.2d 252 (2006).
44. Id. at 444, 629 S.E.2d at 254.
45. Id.
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The Georgia Supreme Court agreed in part but disagreed in part,
holding that the language of the statute was not vague but that it was
overbroad because it "stifles expression or conduct that is otherwise
protected by the Constitution."" The court stated that in balancing the
First Amendment47 protection of free speech against the fundamental
right of free assembly, any statute seeking to criminalize acts of free
speech must be narrowly tailored and reasonably balance the rights of
those wishing to express opposing points of view.4 8 As this statute did
not conform to these requirements, it was properly invalidated.4 9
D. Search and Seizure
1. Warrantless Searches. In the search and seizure area, we begin
with a review of the law of warrantless searches provided by O'Neal v.
State,' ° a case that otherwise says nothing new but happens to be the
first opinion rendered in this year's reporting period. Thus, to review:
"There are at least three tiers of police-citizen encounters: (1) consensual
encounters; (2) brief investigatory stops that require reasonable
suspicion; and (3) arrests that must be supported by probable cause. " "
In the automobile context, it is a first-tier encounter if a police officer
approaches a stopped car to "'inquir[e] into the situation,' 5 2 which
presumably means to ask the occupants why the car is stopped at that
place or some similar inquiry, but it is a second-tier encounter if that car
is stopped because the police officer has blue-lighted it.5 A second-tier
encounter violates the Fourth Amendment 54 when the officer who stops
or seizes the citizen cannot articulate a suspicion of criminal activity.55
In determining whether officers possess an articulable suspicion, the
court evaluates the claimed suspicion within the context of all the
existing circumstances-the so-called "totality of the circumstances"
analysis.56 No exhaustive list of such circumstances exists, but one
may add to the many that arise following the circumstances from

46. Id. at 445, 629 S.E.2d at 254-55 (citing Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591, 449
S.E.2d
47.
48.
49.

94, 95-96 (1994)).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Fielden, 280 Ga. at 446, 629 S.E.2d at 256.
Id.

50. 273 Ga. App. 688, 616 S.E.2d 479 (2005).
51.

Id. at 690, 616 S.E.2d at 481.

52. Id. (quoting Carrera v. State, 261 Ga. App. 832, 834, 584 S.E.2d 2, 4 (2003)).
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. (citing Holmes v. State, 252 Ga. App. 286, 287, 556 S.E.2d 189, 190 (2001)).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
O'Neal, 273 Ga. App. at 688, 690, 616 S.E.2d at 479, 481-82.
Id. at 691, 616 S.E.2d at 482.
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O'Neal: (1) O'Neal's nervousness when approached by officers (which
alone, however, is insufficient to justify a seizure of a citizen); (2)
presence in a neighborhood known for drug activity; (3) the officers'
observations of suspected drug deals having taken place at a specific
house in the neighborhood; and (4) the officers having seen O'Neal drive
to that house and interact briefly with the individuals suspected of
selling drugs there.5 7 Accordingly, the trial court's denial of O'Neal's
motion to suppress was affirmed. 5
The next case, Ward v. State,59 "graphically illustrates that liberties
and rights are always an interpretation away from extinction, unless
jealously and zealously guarded."'
In Ward Officer Reuben Beltran
noticed a car parked in front of a closed gas station very early one
morning, its driver's door ajar. Thinking that someone might be
breaking into the car, he stopped and, upon approaching the car, noticed
two women sitting in it. Thinking that the women may need assistance,
Officer Beltran asked the driver, Ward, why she was parked there.
Ward told Officer Beltran that she was looking for the Super Wal-Mart.
When Beltran noted to Ward that according to the route she described,
she had just driven past the Super Wal-Mart, Ward admitted that she
had lied. She and her friend were actually going to a game room behind
the gas station.6 '
Beltran took the ladies' identification cards from them and went to
check Ward's driver's license. It came back valid and she had no
outstanding warrants. Beltran then asked Ward to step out of the
car.6 2
Even though fifteen minutes had passed since the initial
encounter, at the point when Beltran had Ward get out of her car,63 the
court noted that Beltran moved from a first-tier to a second-tier
encounter. 4 While standing at the rear of her car, Ward gave consent
to Beltran to pat her down for weapons. Upon Beltran feeling a bulge
in her pants pocket, he asked her if she had drugs in there. Ward
replied that she did not and she gave consent for Beltran to search her
pockets. Of course, Ward did have drugs in her pocket (or else we would
have no case to report). The search of Ward's pockets revealed a plastic
bag that contained methamphetamine. Ward was arrested, indicted, and

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
277 Ga. App. 790, 627 S.E.2d 862 (2006).
Id. at 791, 627 S.E.2d at 864.
Id. at 790, 627 S.E.2d at 863-64.
Id. at 791, 627 S.E.2d at 864.
Id.
Id. at 792, 627 S.E.2d at 865.
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after an unsuccessful motion to suppress, convicted of possession of
methamphetamine. 5
66
The court of appeals reversed the denial of the motion to suppress.
The violation of Ward's right to privacy occurred when Beltran had her
step out of the car and asked for and received consent to search her,
even though all he knew was that she had lied about the Super WalMart destination.67 This was an unlawful detention, thus abrogating
any request for and grant of consent to search.6" The Super Wal-Mart
lie did not give Beltran any evidence of criminal activity or reason to
believe that any further
investigation of that lie would yield evidence of
69
criminal activity.
As an aside, the standard of review for a case in which the facts are
not in dispute, as in Ward, is de novo. 70 As the next case shows, if the
facts are in dispute, then the standard of review is that the "trial court's
findings on disputed facts and credibility are adopted unless they are
clearly erroneous."71
In Debord v. State,7 2 police officers stopped a truck for a defective tag
light. Debord was a passenger. The driver had an outstanding warrant
and Debord had been drinking. The officer told Debord to get out of the
truck and testified that he saw a pocketknife clipped to Debord's pants.
The officer testified that he took the knife and conducted a pat-down
search for weapons, during which he found a marijuana pipe in Debord's
shirt pocket. A further search turned up methamphetamine. Debord
was arrested, his motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted.73
The court of appeals reversed because a video tape of the event showed
that the officer's testimony was inaccurate. 74 The court, while taking
officer safety seriously, saw no threat by Debord to justify a pocket-bypocket search, supposedly for weapons.75 Indeed, the video tape did not
even show the pocketknife at all, and no pocketknife was ever introduced
into evidence at the suppression hearing.76 The officer testified further

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 791, 627 S.E.2d at 864.
Id. at 793, 627 S.E.2d at 866.
Id. at 792-93, 627 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 793, 627 S.E.2d at 865.
Id.
Id. at 790, 627 S.E.2d at 863.
Debord v. State, 276 Ga. App. 110, 110, 622 S.E.2d 460, 461 (2005).
276 Ga. App. 110, 622 S.E.2d 460.
Id. at 110-11, 622 S.E.2d at 461.
Id. at 112, 622 S.E.2d at 462.
Id. at 113, 622 S.E.2d at 462.
Id. at 112-13, 622 S.E.2d at 462.
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that he would have only gone into Debord's pockets with consent, but the
court held that "'consent that is the product of an illegal detention is
ineffectual."'7 7 As a result, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court.7 8

In Lyttle v. State,79 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that "the act
of driving at night, lawfully, on a public road in a high crime area does
not justify an investigative stop in the absence of additional circumstances. '8 0 In Cherokee County, there exists a dark and desolate road called
Old Shoal Creek Trail. Without outlets, it leads from a subdivision to
an old church and cemetery, then dead ends into the woods. Several
crimes had occurred there, so the Sheriff's Department ordered one of its
deputies to patrol the area and interdict those of nefarious intent.
Though he had received no reports of illicit behavior on that lonely road
on May 19, 2005,81 the deputy was ready to stop any car he saw there,
including the trial judge, had the judge made the unfortunate decision
to travel the desolate trail that night.8
While driving from the church toward the subdivision, the deputy
encountered Rossie Lyttle driving her pickup truck toward the dead end.
She had her headlights on-it was 1:00 a.m.-and the deputy could not
see who was in the truck. He blue-lighted the truck, Lyttle stopped, and
upon request, produced identification. Then the deputy, surmising that
nobody would be traveling that road without an illicit purpose, requested
permission to search Lyttle's person and purse.8 ' He found a medicine
bottle with marijuana seeds in Lyttle's purse, and in the truck he found
a "hollowed out cigar containing marijuana," commonly known as a
blunt.84 The trial court denied Lyttle's motion to suppress, and she was
convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana.8 5 The court of
appeals reversed the conviction.86 Lyttle's "act of driving at night,
lawfully, on a public road in a high-crime area [did] not justify an

77.
S.E.2d
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 114, 622 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Eaves v. State, 236 Ga. App. 279, 280, 511
621, 623 (1999)).
Id. at 115, 622 S.E.2d at 463.
279 Ga. App. 659, 632 S.E.2d 394 (2006).
Id. at 661, 632 S.E.2d at 396.
Id. at 660, 632 S.E.2d at 395.
Id., 632 S.E.2d at 396.
Id., 632 S.E.2d at 395.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 662, 632 S.E.2d at 396-97.
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investigative stop."" The deputy
had only a generalized suspicion, and
88
that was not good enough.
In Castleberry v. State, 9 Castleberry ran a red light while driving his
Chevy Blazer in Gainesville back in May 2003. Two officers stopped
him, and upon approaching from the passenger side, Officer Ottoway
saw the barrel of a shotgun on the floor of Castleberry's truck. The
officers ordered Castleberry out of his truck, and Ottoway patted him
down for weapons, finding some shotgun shells. The officers then
searched the truck and took the shotgun. They concluded that the
shotgun was sawed off and too short to be legal-though they turned out
to be wrong in this assessment when they got to the police station and
measured it-but before they arrested Castleberry, a third officer showed
up, Officer Rutledge, to back up his colleagues. Rutledge ordered
Castleberry to keep his hands out of his pockets, but Castleberry
continued to put them in and fidget. Rutledge patted him down. He felt
a hard object in one of Castleberry's pockets, so he reached in and took
it. It was a glass pipe, which contained methamphetamine residue.9 °
Of course, the initial traffic stop was legal because Castleberry had
run a red light in full view of two police officers. The brief detention to
investigate the shotgun did not offend Fourth Amendment principles
either, because there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a
possible crime.9
Both pat-downs of Castleberry were fine as well,
because officer safety is a reasonable concern that can be addressed by
frisking a person who may be armed and dangerous. 92 Even going into
a citizen's pocket to retrieve what the officer believes to be a weapon is
permissible:
Under Terry, an officer is authorized to pat down a suspect's outer
clothing. He may intrude beneath the surface in only two instances:
(1) if he comes upon something that feels like a weapon, or (2) if he
as contraband
feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
93
immediately apparent, i.e., the "plain feel" doctrine.
But the trouble in this case was that Rutledge testified that he did not
know what the hard object in Castleberry's pocket was.94 According to

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id., 632 S.E.2d at 396.
Id. at 661, 632 S.E.2d at 396.
275 Ga. App. 37, 619 S.E.2d 747 (2005).
Id. at 37-38, 619 S.E.2d at 748-49.
Id. at 38-39, 619 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. at 39, 619 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. (quoting Howard v. State, 253 Ga. App. 158, 160, 558 S.E.2d 745, 748 (2002)).
Id., 619 S.E.2d at 749-50.
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Rutledge, "'It could have been anything,"' weapon or otherwise. 95 The
court held that if hardness alone justified intrusion into Castleberry's
pocket, the Fourth Amendment would be eviscerated.9" The court
therefore reversed the denial of Castleberry's motion to suppress. 97 The
cynical among us-those who have done scores of suppression hearings
in which an officer's account can hardly be challenged-wonder whether
this case will make the rounds among traffic patrol officers for the clear
lesson that "hard" equals "weapon," not just "anything." The outcome of
the case turns on it.
In Rucker v. State,9" a police officer received a phone call from a
person he had arrested in the past.9 9 The person gave the officer the
following information: "'Rook,' a black male slightly over six feet tall
with a muscular build, would be behind the wheel of a 1988 beige and
brown Delta at a local health department with his girlfriend as a
passenger. The tipster told the officer that 'Rook' had some cocaine in
his possession."'00 The officer found a man named Rucker at the
health department in a car with a woman, just as described by the
tipster. A stop and search turned up cocaine in the woman's clothing.
Rucker was charged with trafficking and convicted after an unsuccessful
motion to suppress.' 01
The court of appeals reversed, focusing upon the key distinction
between a tip by a "concerned citizen," as the State argued the tipster
was, and an "informant of unknown reliability," as the court held the
tipster to be. 0 2 Tipster law works like this: The threshold question
is whether the police officer possesses specific and articulable facts that
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.10 3 If so, the
officer may briefly detain a suspect to investigate.'
The source of
those specific articulable facts, however, is crucial. If the source is a
concerned citizen, then the tip is deemed to be reliable. 0 5 If the source
is a known but untested informant, the information must be "of
'sufficient detail to predict the future behavior of third parties that

95. Id. at 40, 619 S.E.2d at 750.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 276 Ga. App. 683, 624 S.E.2d 259 (2005).
99. Id. at 683-84, 624 S.E.2d at 260-61.
100. Id. at 683, 624 S.E.2d at 260-61.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 684, 624 S.E.2d at 261.
103. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Hudson v. State, 253 Ga. App. 210, 211, 558 S.E.2d 420, 422 (2001));
see also Scott v. State, 277 Ga. App. 126, 128-29, 625 S.E.2d 526, 528-29 (2006).
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otherwise would not be easily predicted; in other words, it must consist
of inside information that is unavailable to the general public.'" 10 6 The
court noted that an anonymous tip is less reliable than information
provided by a known but untested informant. 10 7 However, in this case,
the known but untested informant gave details that anyone could
observe and that did not predict any future behavior.' ° Therefore, the
denial of Rucker's motion to suppress was reversed. 0 9
2. Consensual Searches. We reported in last year's edition of this
survey that the court of appeals had remanded a case in which a teenage
son had responded "sure" to a police officer's request to search the
teenager's father's bedroom, holding that the trial court record had failed
to establish the so-called Atkins factors: Whether (1) the minor giving
consent to search a parent's private place lives at that place, (2) has
right of access and the right to invite others over, (3) has reached an age
to exercise at least minimal discretion, and (4) whether officers acted
reasonably in believing that the minor had sufficient control over the
premises to give a valid consent to search." 0 On remand, the trial
court heard additional evidence in State v. McKinney."' After hearing
the additional evidence, the trial court concluded that factors (2) and (4)
were not met by the State and again granted the defendant's motion to
suppress." 2 The court of appeals affirmed."'
3. School Searches. In State v. K.L.M.," 4 a student reported to
the principal that he overheard fellow student K.L.M. say that he
planned to sell drugs while serving in-school suspension. The principal
called for assistance from local law enforcement and a Peace Officer

106. Rucker, 276 Ga. App. at 684, 624 S.E.2d at 261 (citing State v. Davenport, 268 Ga.
App. 704, 706, 603 S.E.2d 324, 326 (2004)); see also State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 250,
630 S.E.2d 847, 850 (2006).
107. Rucker, 276 Ga. App. at 684, 624 S.E.2d at 261 (citing Bentley v. State, 214 Ga.
App. 580, 582, 448 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1994)).
108. Id.; see also Baker v. State, 277 Ga. App. 520, 522-23, 627 S.E.2d 145, 148-49
(2006) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the
confidential informant's tip and the officer's own observations were sufficient to support
the stop).
109. Rucker, 276 Ga. App. at 685, 624 S.E.2d at 261.
110. Laura D. Hogue & Franklin J. Hogue, CriminalLaw, 57 MERCER L. REV. 113, 11819 (2005) (citing State v. McKinney, 268 Ga. App. 296, 298, 601 S.E.2d 777, 779 (2004));
McKinney, 268 Ga. App. at 298-99, 601 S.E.2d at 779-80.
111. 276 Ga. App. 69, 622 S.E.2d 429 (2005).
112. Id. at 72-73, 622 S.E.2d at 433.
113. Id. at 74, 622 S.E.2d at 434.
114. 278 Ga. App. 219, 628 S.E.2d 651 (2006).
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Standards and Training ("P.O.S.T.") certified peace officer showed up.
The principal then called K.L.M. to the office, where he denied any plans
to sell drugs and denied any possession of drugs. The principal told the
police officer to search the student, and the officer found a stash of
marijuana.115 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's granting
of the juvenile's motion to suppress because the involvement of the law
enforcement officer raised the standard for a nonconsensual, warrantless
search of a student to probable cause, which did not exist." 6 The court
of appeals cited the Georgia Supreme Court case of State v. Young," 7
in which the supreme court observed that with respect to the Fourth
Amendment, "there are really three groups: private persons; governmental agents whose conduct is state action invoking the Fourth Amendment; and governmental law enforcement agents for whose violations of
the Fourth Amendment the exclusionary rule will be applied."""
School officials fall within the second category, and the exclusionary rule
does not apply." 9 But when, as here, the school official involves law
enforcement, then probable cause must exist. 20
If probable cause does
21
not exist, then the evidence will be excluded.'
4. Search Warrants. It is almost always noteworthy when the
courts exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. This is
never more so than when evidence is excluded in a murder case in which
the State seeks the death penalty. That is exactly what happened this
reporting period in Miley v. State. 22 Ashley Neves went missing, and
her body was discovered in May 2000. Police had asked for information
about the case. In response, Miley showed up at the police station one
day. During his interview of Miley, Detective Scott asked him if he
could go to Miley's house to search a book bag that a witness had said
that Miley was wearing when he was last seen with Neves. Miley
agreed to retrieve the book bag for Scott, but he would not give consent
to Scott to enter his house to retrieve it himself. Scott did not like that
plan, so he applied for a search warrant from the local magistrate
12
judge.

115. Id. at 219-20, 628 S.E.2d at 652.
116. Id. at 221, 628 S.E.2d at 653.
117. 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).
118. K.L.M., 278 Ga. App. at 220, 628 S.E.2d at 652 (citing Young, 234 Ga. at 493, 216
S.E.2d at 591).
119. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 653.
120. Id. at 221, 628 S.E.2d at 653.
121. Id.
122. 279 Ga. 420, 614 S.E.2d 744 (2005).
123. Id. at 421, 614 S.E.2d at 744-45.
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The affidavit used to support Scott's contention of probable cause
mentioned two grounds: (1) Miley refused to give consent to the search
and (2) Miley was the last person seen with Neves on the date and place
of her death and he had a book bag with him.'24 The supreme court
concluded that the first ground was constitutionally improper, as every
citizen enjoys the absolute right to refuse to give consent to any police
intrusion into their private spaces, and such refusal can never be used
as a basis for probable cause to believe that the citizen is involved in
crime. 125 But even the second, and only legitimate, consideration of
the existence of probable cause failed. As the Georgia Supreme Court
noted:
These assertions were insufficient to show probable cause to believe
that Miley was the perpetrator, because they failed to detail how close
to the time of the murder's commission Miley had been seen with the
victim, because they failed to describe the circumstances under which
Miley and the victim had been seen together, and because an innocent
person could have had a book bag at the unspecified scene of the
murder. Nothing of a properly probative nature in the affidavit, other
than this inadequate suggestion of Miley's guilt, even attempted to
make a connection between the murder and the house to be
searched. 126
As a result, any evidence seized from Miley's book bag or home which
could have shown that he was Neves's killer was excluded from his
death penalty trial.127 While reasonable people can differ over whether
the exclusionary rule is the best way to handle evidence illegally seized,
all can agree that so long as we have that rule in place-and it has been
with us a long time 2 -police, magistrate judges, and any others in
law enforcement who seek to solve crimes should give the Fourth
Amendment all the deference it deserves, especially in these times when
civil liberties are in decline.
E.

Right to Counsel

The Sixth Amendment 129 right to counsel extends the constitutional
right to "representation that is free from conflicts of interest."'
In

124.

Id. at 421-22, 614 S.E.2d at 745.

125. Id. (citing Gardner v. State, 255 Ga. App. 489,493-94, 566 S.E.2d 329, 332 (2002);
State v. Kwiatkowski, 238 Ga. App. 390, 393, 519 S.E.2d 43, 46 (1999)).
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

129.
130. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981).
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3
Howerton v. Danenberg,"'
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
habeas court's decision to grant Danenberg's pro se petition on the
ground that Danenberg's trial counsel was operating under an actual
conflict of interest.'32 Danenberg had been indicted for the offense of
murder and the district attorney was seeking the death penalty. 33 Yet
at the same time Danenberg's trial counsel was representing Danenberg,
he was also defending the district attorney in a well-publicized federal
challenge to the district attorney's
use of peremptory strikes to remove
13 4
minorities from his juries.
The supreme court held that "an actual conflict of interest existed
because of defense counsel's concurrent representation of Danenburg and
the district attorney, and given the enormity of the penalty, the conflict
was completely impermissible." 35 The court noted that although there
had been no indication that the trial attorney had performed deficiently
or dishonorably in his representation of Danenberg, "even the performance of the most honorable attorney under similar circumstances could
be subtly or unknowingly affected in ways difficult to detect on
review."16 As a result, the supreme court held that the defendant's
conviction and sentence should be reversed and that he should be
afforded the right 37
to a new trial with representation free from any
conflict of interest.

F

Grand Jury

Although, as the Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged, it is "'almost
inconceivable"' that any prosecutor would believe that remaining in the
grand jury room during deliberations was permissible, the prosecutors
In chalin Effimgham County proved otherwise in Colon v. State.'
13 9
lenging his convictions for multiple sexual offenses against a child,
Colon argued that his case required reversal because the sanctity of the
grand jury process had been violated by the presence of prosecutors
remaining in the room as the grand jurors deliberated. At the motion
for new trial, the defense offered testimony from a grand juror that the
prosecutor remained in the room during deliberations. The district

131. 279 Ga. 861, 621 S.E.2d 738 (2005).
132. Id. at 861, 621 S.E.2d at 739.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 862, 621 S.E.2d at 740.
135. Id. at 863, 621 S.E.2d at 740.
136. Id. at 864, 621 S.E.2d at 741.
137. Id.
138. 275 Ga. App. 73, 76, 619 S.E.2d 773, 778 (2005) (quoting McClendon v. May, 37
F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 1999)).
139. Id. at 73, 619 S.E.2d at 776.
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attorney and assistant district attorney further agreed that they often
remained in the140grand jury room during deliberations as they prepared
their next case.
There was no evidence that the presence of the prosecutors had any
actual affect upon the deliberative process.14 ' Nevertheless, the court
of appeals held that it was harmful "as a matter of law" for a prosecutor
to remain in the jury room when the jurors were deliberating or voting
on an indictment. 142 However, because trial counsel failed to raise a
challenge to the grand jury process,
the error was not preserved and
14
Colon's convictions were affirmed.
G.

Discovery

In Schofield v. Palmer,'" a vigilant appellate attorney fought the
system for years to recover from the State what the Georgia Supreme
Court has now declared to be significant, material evidence for impeachment-the Georgia Bureau of Investigation ("GBI") records evidencing
the amount of money paid to a testifying informant. 145 After Palmer
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, his appellate attorneys
made numerous requests to the GBI for records pertaining to the
confidential, testifying informant.' 46 All attempts, including a civil
lawsuit under the Open Records Act, 1 47 were unsuccessful until the
state habeas
court ordered the production of the records for an in camera
14
inspection.
In camera inspection of the records revealed that five days after
Palmer's arrest, the informant had been paid $500 for providing
information implicating Palmer in the murder-information that had
never been provided to the defense. 49 In an excellent common-sense
approach to analyzing the significance of this evidence, the habeas court
concluded that there was a reversible Brady.. error by determining
that (1) the State possessed this evidence (because the GBI is an arm of
the State); (2) the State had not provided the defense with the evidence
nor could the defense have obtained it on their own; (3) the State

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 73, 75-76, 619 S.E.2d at 776, 777.
Id. at 76, 619 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 77, 619 S.E.2d at 778.
Id. at 78-79, 619 S.E.2d at 779.
279 Ga. 848, 621 S.E.2d 726 (2005).
Id. at 853, 621 S.E.2d at 731.
Id. at 848, 850-51, 621 S.E.2d at 728, 729-30.
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2002 & Supp. 2006).
Schofield, 279 Ga. at 850-51, 621 S.E.2d at 729-30.
Id. at 851, 621 S.E.2d at 730.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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suppressed the evidence; and (4) had the evidence been provided to the
defense, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different-often referred to as the materiality tier.15 '
The habeas court found that the suppressed evidence was material
because it deprived Palmer from impeaching the informant with "'an
age-old, logical, pecuniary argument that [he] had a motive to lie"' when
he testified. 152 The habeas court took issue with the State's argument
against materiality by pointing out the "great lengths" to which the state
had gone to conceal the evidence of payment.15 3 The supreme court
opinion vacating the conviction and sentence was strong: "We cannot
countenance the deliberate suppression by the State of a payment to a
key witness, and its attendant corruption of the truth-seeking process,
in any case, and especially in a death penalty case."'54
III.

STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF

A.

Elements of Proof
The State is required to prove each and every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet the Georgia Legislature, in promulgating O.C.G.A. section 16-8-4(a), 55 imposed a mandatory presumption
of intent that unconstitutionally relieved the State of proving intent-an
essential element of the offense of theft by conversion of leased property.
In Sherrod v. State,'5 6 Ms. Sherrod, who shared an apartment with her
boyfriend, leased a stereo from a "Rentown" store. Soon after leasing the
stereo, Sherrod got into an argument with her boyfriend and moved out.
Her boyfriend would not let her back into the apartment to retrieve the
stereo, and it is assumed that he later pawned the stereo.'57
Rentown sent Sherrod a demand letter pursuant to O.C.G.A. section
She was arrested for the
16-8-4, but Sherrod did not respond.'
offense of theft by conversion of leased property.'5 9 At trial, the State
relied upon the mandatory presumption set forth in the statute, which
provided that Sherrod's failure to return the property within five days
of the properly delivered demand letter meant that Sherrod "shall be

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Schofield, 279 Ga. at 852, 621 S.E.2d at 731.
Id. at 853, 621 S.E.2d at 731 (brackets in original).
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 16-8-4(a) (2003).
280 Ga. 275, 627 S.E.2d 36 (2006).
Id. at 277, 627 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. at 276-77, 627 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. at 275, 627 S.E.2d at 37.
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presumed to have knowingly converted such personal property to such
person's own use."160
Sherrod challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory presumption
16 1
in the Georgia Supreme Court, and her conviction was overturned.
The court held that the mandatory presumption was unconstitutional
because it "'subvert[s] the presumption of innocence accorded to accused
persons,'" thereby removing from the State's burden of proof the
essential element of intent to commit the theft. 162 Had the presumption been permissive, the statute would have passed constitutional
muster; it was the "shall be" language of a mandatory presumption that
invalidated this provision. 16
B.

Hearsay
Permitting one witness to testify as to their opinion concerning the
veracity of another witness is known as bolstering the credibility of the
other witness. It is now, and has always been, impermissible. Yet in
the area of child sexual offenses, this rule is often violated. And in this
reporting period, the appellate courts reversed two convictions for this
violation. In Patterson v. State,"M the defendant was being tried for
the offenses of child molestation and aggravated battery.165
The
alleged victim was a fifteen-year-old girl. 166 At trial, the State called
Dr. Battle, an "expert" in clinical psychology and forensic interviewing, 1 7 to testify to the substance of the forensic interview of the
child. 6'
The problem began when the State asked Dr. Battle, "'And
at any time did you ever feel like [the victim] made up the story that she
70
69
Dr. Battle replied, "No."'
told you to get back at her father?""
On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Battle "if she believed
that the victim made up the allegations against Patterson 'for any
'
reason. ' '" Again, Dr. Battle responded, "'No. "172

160. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-8-4(c)(2) (2003)).
161.

Id.

162. Id. at 276, 627 S.E.2d at 37, 38 (quoting Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265
(1989)).
163. Id.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

278 Ga. App. 168, 628 S.E.2d 618 (2006).
Id. at 168, 628 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 168 n.1, 628 S.E.2d at 619 n.1.
Id. at 168 n.2, 628 S.E.2d at 619 n.2.
Id. at 168, 628 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 169, 628 S.E.2d at 619 (brackets in original).

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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Defense counsel objected, but the trial court ruled that the State could
elicit such testimony to rehabilitate the credibility of the child because
the defense had attacked her credibility on cross-examination.'
The
trial court's ruling had some support in the case law. In 2002 the
Georgia Court of Appeals decided the case of Smith v. State,1 4 "a
departure from well-established case and statutory law prohibiting the
admission of expert opinion testimony that bolsters the credibility of a
witness or expresses an opinion on the ultimate issue of whether the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged."'7 5 Recognizing their mistake
in Smith, the court of appeals overruled the case and stated, yet again,
the long-standing rule that "'a witness, even an expert, can never bolster
the credibility of another witness as to whether the witness is telling the
truth.""7
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed Patterson's

conviction. 177
It is no more improper for the judge to comment on the witness's
17
credibility than it is for another witness to do so. In Craft v. State,
the defendant was tried and convicted of two counts of child molestation.'79 Two fifteen-year-old girls testified that while walking to
school, they passed Craft's home and Craft said, "'Hey, look over
here,'" as he stood naked, masturbating.'80 The girls testified that
they ran from Craft's home to school and immediately told the assistant
principal what they had seen.''
At trial, after the assistant principal testified regarding the report
from the girls, the trial court asked the assistant principal a number of
questions concerning "'what kind of students'" the two girls were.' 2
The witness testified that one of the girls was a cheerleader,' 3 though
both victims were actually cheerleaders."M The witness also testified
that the girls were "very good students[,] ... mannerable[, and] very

173. Id.
174. 257 Ga. App. 88, 570 S.E.2d 400 (2002).
175. Patterson, 278 Ga. App. at 170, 628 S.E.2d at 619-20.
176. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 620 (quoting Mann v. State, 252 Ga. App. 70, 72, 555 S.E.2d
527, 529 (2001)) (citation and punctuation omitted in original).
177. Id. at 173, 628 S.E.2d at 621.
178. 274 Ga. App. 410, 618 S.E.2d 104 (2005).
179. Id. at 410, 618 S.E.2d at 105.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 410-11, 618 S.E.2d at 105-06.
183. Id. at 411, 618 S.E.2d at 106.
184. Id. at 411 n.3, 618 S.E.2d at 106 n.3.
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poli[t]e young ladies," and that they could not fail a class or they would
no longer be cheerleaders."'
Trial counsel did not object to this testimony but, instead, sought to
cross-examine the witness with evidence that contradicted such a
characterization of the victims. 8 ' The defense had evidence that both
girls had failed at least two classes, one had been disciplined for
disrespect and had been placed on administrative detention, and the
other had been disciplined for screaming in the hallways, which directly
contradicted the witness's testimony that "they are not ones that are real
wild and real, you know, loud in the halls and everything."'8 7
The trial court curtailed the defense from developing this crossexamination and admitting the documents to contradict the witness's
testimony by stating, "[Ylou're not going to make these victims look
bad."'
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in two
significant ways. 8 9 First, the court violated O.C.G.A. section 17-857190 by intimating to the jury, through the questions the court posed
to the assistant principal, its opinion that the girls were credible. 191
And second, the court improperly foreclosed a relevant and permissible
cross-examination to contradict the witness's testimony concerning her
description of the girls, further demonstrating that the court had already
192
made up its mind concerning the veracity of the State's witnesses.
The second error, coupled with the first, was sufficient in the minds of
four of the appellate judges to require reversal.'93
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The landscape of an eyewitness identification case was substantially
changed in 2000 with the opinion of Johnson v. State,' which overruled prior opinions and permits expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification in cases where (1) eyewitness identification of the
defendant is a key element of the State's case; (2) there is no substantial
corroboration of the identification by other evidence; and (3) expert
eyewitness testimony is the only effective way to reveal any weakness

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 411, 618 S.E.2d at 106 (last alteration in original).
Id. at 412, 618 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 411, 413, 618 S.E.2d at 106, 107.
Id. at 412, 618 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 412-13, 618 S.E.2d at 106-07.
O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (2004).
Craft, 274 Ga. App. at 412, 618 S.E.2d at 106-07.
Id. at 413, 618 S.E.2d at 107.
Id., 415, 618 S.E.2d at 107, 108.
272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549 (2000).
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in an eyewitness identification.1 95 Since that opinion, scores of eyewitness identification experts have testified in Georgia and throughout the
country, and those experts are consistent in the opinion that an
eyewitness's assessment of how "certain" he or she is about the
196
identification is a poor indicator of the validity of the identification.
Yet until this reporting period, the pattern jury instruction still directed
the jury to consider "the level of certainty showed by the witness about
his/her identification" in assessing the reliability of the identification.'9 7
In Brodes v. State,"' a successful challenge was launched against
this provision in the pattern charge. Brodes was convicted of two counts
of armed robbery based entirely on the testimony of two eyewitnesses.' 99 At trial, both witnesses testified repeatedly that they were
"'absolutely certain"' that Brodes was the perpetrator. 20 0 The trial
court gave the pattern charge containing the "level of certainty"
language. 201 Brodes was convicted, appealed to the Georgia Court of
Appeals, and his convictions were affirmed. 0 2
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question,
"'[WIhether a trial court errs in using the "level of certainty" charge in
instructing the jury on assessing the reliability of eyewitness identification.' ' 2 3 The eyewitness identification expert testified at Brodes's trial
that "there is not a good relationship between a witness's level of
confidence in his identification and the accuracy."0 4 Drawing upon a
wealth of studies, the expert showed that the accuracy of one's recollection is not highly correlated with the person's confidence in that
memory.20 5 Yet the expert proved that the intuition of lay persons

195.

Id. at 257, 526 S.E.2d at 552-53 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,

1230-31 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985)).
196.

See, e.g., State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490-91 (Utah 1986). In Long the Supreme

Court of Utah listed a significant number of scholarly articles on the subject. Id. See also
Brodes v. State, 279 Ga. 435,438,440,614 S.E.2d 766, 769, 770 (2005); Connie Mayer, Due
Process Challenges to Eyewitness IdentificationBased on PretrialPhotographicArrays, 13
PACE L. REV. 815 (1994) (reviewing twelve articles or studies on the reliability of

eyewitness identification).
197. COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GEORGIA, SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL CASES § 206.00 (2d ed. 2001).

198.
199.
200.
201.

279 Ga. 435, 614 S.E.2d 766 (2005).
Id. at 435, 614 S.E.2d at 767.
Id.
Id. at 435-36, 614 S.E.2d at 767.

202. Id. at 436, 614 S.E.2d at 767.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id. at 438, 614 S.E.2d at 769.
Id., 614 S.E.2d at 768-69.
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(that is, jurors) is that a person's certainty in the reliability of their
identification does correlate with the accuracy of that identification. 0 6
The tension between science and common understanding compelled the
supreme court to discontinue the use of the "level of certainty" instruction.20 7 Accordingly, the court in Brodes held that the error was
harmful because the instruction undoubtedly affected the outcome of the
trial. 0 8 As a result, Brodes-and any other defendant against whom
the State presents eyewitness testimony-gets a new trial where the
"level of certainty" will no longer be charged to the jurors who must
29
assess the reliability of the eyewitness testimony.
V.

CLOSING ARGUMENT

21 °

In Palma v. State,
the trial court improperly prohibited the
defense from arguing in closing the specific sentence from which a
cooperating codefendant was spared by testifying against Palma.2 1'
Palma was tried and convicted of murder and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony. The shooting was gang-related, and
the evidence of Palma's involvement was that he supplied the murder
weapons to the codefendant shooters. The codefendants struck a deal
with the State and testified against Palma.2 12 During their direct
testimony, they each described the sentences they were facing and the
deals they had received by cooperating with the State.2 13
In his closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to believe the
codefendants by asking, "'Why would they lie?"'21 4
The defense
responded in its closing argument by reminding the jury of the evidence
concerning the possible sentence the witnesses could have received had
they not aligned themselves with the State. The State objected, arguing
that a discussion of punishment was not a proper subject for closing
argument. The trial court agreed and prohibited the defense from
making any specific references to possible punishment.2 5

206. Id., 614 S.E.2d at 769.
207. Id. at 442, 614 S.E.2d at 771.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 442-43, 614 S.E.2d at 771. Relying upon Brodes, another conviction based
entirely on eyewitness identification was reversed for the trial court's error in charging the
"level of certainty" language to the jury. Brown v. State, 277 Ga. App. 396, 396-97, 626
S.E.2d 596, 597 (2006).
210. 280 Ga. 108, 624 S.E.2d 137 (2005).
211. Id. at 110, 624 S.E.2d at 138-39.
212. Id. at 108-09, 624 S.E.2d at 138.
213. Id. at 109, 624 S.E.2d at 138.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 109-10, 624 S.E.2d at 138.
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The supreme court held that the trial court committed reversible error
in not permitting the defense to argue the extent of the benefit the
witnesses received by testifying against Palma, as the evidence was
properly admitted and rationally related to an argument that the
witnesses were biased.2 16
VI.

A.

SENTENCING

Recidivist Punishment

In order for a prior conviction to serve as the basis for enhanced
sentencing under any of the recidivist statutes, the burden is placed
upon the State to prove "both the existence of the prior guilty pleas and
that the defendant was represented by counsel in all felony cases and
those misdemeanor proceedings where imprisonment resulted."21 7 The
Georgia Court of Appeals expanded the proof of representation for
misdemeanors in Simmons v. State. 8 Simmons was sentenced as a
repeat shoplifter after the State admitted into evidence, without
objection, copies of two previous felony shoplifting convictions. The State
also admitted into evidence, over Simmons's objections, two additional
felony shoplifting convictions and three misdemeanor shoplifting
convictions, which Simmons argued were uncounseled.1 9
On appeal, the State conceded its failure to prove that Simmons was
counseled with regard to the two felony convictions to which Simmons
22
objectedY.
But the State argued that it was not required to demonstrate that Simmons was represented by counsel in the misdemeanor
cases because there was no evidence that "'imprisonment resulted,"' and
thus the State had no burden to prove that Simmons was represented. 22' The court of appeals acknowledged that the State's argument
was supported by the law in Georgia but concluded that Georgia law had
to be expanded to "take into account the recent expansion of the right to
counsel to include those misdemeanor cases in which the defendant
receives a suspended or probated sentence of imprisonment,"222 as the
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Id. at 110, 624 S.E.2d at 138-39.
Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 285, 519 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1999).
278 Ga. App. 372, 374-75, 629 S.E.2d 86, 88 (2006).
Id. at 374, 629 S.E.2d at 88.
Id.
Id. (quoting Nash, 271 Ga. at 285, 519 S.E.2d at 896).
Id.
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United States Supreme Court had done in Alabama v. Shelton,2 23 and
the Georgia Supreme Court had decided in Barnes v. State.22 4
Applying Shelton and Barnes, the court of appeals held that valid use
of a prior misdemeanor conviction required proof that the defendant was
represented by counsel if imprisonment resulted from the misdemeanor
conviction or "the defendant received a probated or suspended sentence."225 As a result, Simmons's case was remanded for sentencing
according to the new rule.226
B.

Conditions of Probation

A condition of probation cannot exceed the length of the sentence that
is imposed.227 In Kaiser v State,22 s when Dr. Kaiser pleaded guilty
to over sixty counts of unauthorized manufacture and dispensation of
controlled substances pursuant to a plea agreement in which he agreed
to surrender his medical license, it was illegal for the trial court to
impose a special condition of probation that the "'[diefendant shall not
ever practice Medicine in the229State of Georgia or in any State contiguous
with the State of Georgia.' ,
During the same reporting period, the Georgia Supreme Court granted
an application for certificate of probable cause in Harvey v. Meadows, 23 0 a habeas case, to answer the question, "[Wlhether a sentencing
court's oral warning to a defendant of the consequences of violating a
special condition of probation substantially complies with the statutory
requirement of O.C.G.A. [section] 42-8-34.1(a)(2) 231 that the sentencing
court give the warning in writing in the court's sentence."232 After
pleading guilty to the offense of theft by taking, the petitioner received
a sentence that included a period of probation. While on probation, the
petitioner committed the new offense of driving under the influence. 3
The sentencing court revoked six months of his probation and kept his
probation conditions the same, but stated that "hereafter all of the

223. 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).
224. 275 Ga. 499, 501, 570 S.E.2d 277, 279 (2002).
225. Simmons, 278 Ga. App. at 375, 629 S.E.2d at 88.
226. Id., 629 S.E.2d at 88-89.
227. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a)(1) (2004 & Supp. 2006).
228. 275 Ga. App. 684, 621 S.E.2d 802 (2005).
229. Id. at 684, 621 S.E.2d at 803. In the wake of additional increased punishment and
reporting requirements for sex offenders, the Authors question whether life-long
registration requirements violate this mandate.
230. 280 Ga. 166, 626 S.E.2d 92 (2006).
231. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34.1(a)(2) (1997 & Supp. 2006).
232. Harvey, 280 Ga. at 166, 626 S.E.2d at 93.
233. Id.
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conditions of your sentence are special conditions of probation which will,
if you violate them, subject you to the possibility that all of your
probation could be revoked and you could be sent to prison for the
balance of whatever term remains."234 The written order accompanying this oral sentence did not warn the petitioner that if he violated a
special condition of probation, he would face the possibility of having all
of his probation revoked.235
Approximately six months later, the petitioner was back before the
court for various misdemeanors. The court revoked the balance of his
probation, which amounted to five years and six months. The petitioner
filed an unsuccessful habeas, arguing that the sentencing court's failure
to comply with O.C.G.A. section 42-8-34.1(a)(2), which requires that the
effect of violating a special condition of probation be placed in writing,
effectively kept the probation conditions as general conditions, thereby
limiting the
sentencing court to two-years revocation for a misdemeanor
2 3
violation. 1
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed and reversed the full revocation
of the petitioner's probation, holding that the statutory language
requiring that trial courts warn defendants in writing of the consequences of violating a special condition of probation is an essential requirement for imposition of the punishments associated with violating a
special condition of probation.2 37
VII.

APPELLATE ISSUES

8

the defendant, Andrews, pleaded guilty to
In Andrews v. State,
possession of cocaine and marijuana and was sentenced pursuant to the
As
Drug Court Program provided for in O.C.G.A. section 16-13-2(a).
a condition of the Drug Court Program, Andrews agreed to avoid contact
with "'drug users and drug dealers.'"2 4 ' A year and a half later,
however, Andrews was stopped by the police while driving a car in which
his passenger had set up a drug sale and was transporting 126 grams
of cocaine to a confidential informant. The court found that Andrews
had violated the conditions of the Drug Court Program, removed him
from it, adjudicated him guilty of the drug charges to which he had
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Id. at 167, 626 S.E.2d at 93.
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Id. at 169-70, 626 S.E.2d at 95.
276 Ga. App. 428, 623 S.E.2d 247 (2005).
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previously
pleaded guilty, and sentenced him to ten years, five to
24 1
serve.

Andrews filed a direct appeal to this ruling. 24 2 The Georgia Court
of Appeals considered for the first time, "[Wihen a defendant is
adjudicated guilty and sentenced after the trial court finds he violated
a Drug Court Contract made pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 16-13-2(a), is
he entitled to a direct appeal, or is an application for discretionary
appeal required under O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35(a)(5)?"24 3 The court of
appeals concluded that, like revocation of probation proceedings
pursuant to the first offender statute,24 4 a Drug Court Program is a
deferred adjudication, violations of which are appealable only after
compliance with the discretionary appeal provisions of O.C.G.A. section
5-6-35(a)(5). 245 As this was a case of first impression, the court agreed
to hear Andrews's appeal on direct appeal. 246 However, the court
affirmed the violation of the Drug Court provisions and corresponding
adjudication of guilt and sentence.247
VIII.

CONCLUSION

During this reporting period, some strides were made in protecting the
rights of incompetent and non-English speaking defendants. Payment
records for cooperating government witnesses now constitute material
evidence and must be provided to the defense. An erroneous court of
appeals opinion permitting bolstering of a State's witness was finally
overruled. The use in recidivist sentencing of uncounseled misdemeanor
pleas has been further narrowed. And juries in eyewitness identification
cases are now receiving better, more accurate jury instructions to guide
their deliberations. The continued vigilance and creativity of those
trying criminal cases insures that the landscape of criminal jurisprudence continues to evolve. Our hope remains that the evolution of
criminal law preserves the liberties we all cherish and achieves justice.
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